UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X Docket#

ROBERT BARTLETT, ET AL., : 19-cv-00007(CBA)(TAM)

Plaintiffs,

: U.S. Courthouse - versus -

: Brooklyn, New York

SOCIETE GENERALE DE BANQUE

AU LIBAN SAL, ET AL.,

Defendants

: October 8, 2021
: 4:40 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR TELEPHONE STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE TARYN A. MERKL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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(Appearances continue on next page)

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3 Proceedings 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Ms. Chan, could 2 you please call the case? THE CLERK: This is Civil Cause for a Status 3 Conference, Docket 19-cv-7, Bartlett et al. v. Societe 4 5 Generale de Banque au Liban SAL, et al. 6 Before asking the parties to state their 7 appearance, I would like to note the following. Persons 8 granted remote access to proceedings are reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and 10 re-broadcasting of court proceedings. Violation of these 11 prohibitions may result in sanctions including removal of 12 court-issued media credentials, restricted entry to 13 future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or 14 any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court. MR. OSEN: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is 15 16 Gary Osen from Osen LLC for the plaintiff. I'm joined by 17 my colleagues Ari Ugar, Michael Radine, and Dina 18 Gielchinsky. 19 THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all. And 20 just to keep things orderly, I know we have a number of 21 parties on the line, so if you could try to identify 22 yourself and let me know who you're here on behalf of for 23 the defendants, I would appreciate it.

I note at the outset that we may be missing counsel for Societe Generale and another one of the

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4 Proceedings banks, Lebanon Bank. So if anybody is also representing 1 2 those parties for purposes of today or has discussed this 3 with their counsel for those entities, I'd like to know 4 that too. 5 So take it away starting I guess with 6 Fransabank if we don't have Societe Generale on the line. 7 MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, your Honor. This is Linda Goldstein of Dechert. I am counsel to both Fransabank 8 and BLOM Bank. I'm joined on the line by my colleagues 9 10 Michael McGinley and Tamar Mallat. 11 And I have spoken with counsel from DLA and am 12 authorized to speak on their client's behalf as well. 13 THE COURT: Thank you for that. I appreciate 14 it. MR. BERGER: Good afternoon, your Honor, this 15 16 is Mitchell Berger from Squire Patton Boggs along with my 17 colleagues Gassan Baloul and Joe Alonzo. We represent 18 MEAB Bank, Lebanon and Gulf Bank, and Fenicia Bank. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. Who else do we have? 20 MR. HAMBURG: Good afternoon, your Honor. This 21 is Robert Hamburg of Mayer Brown representing Banque Libano-Francaise. 22 23 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 24 MR. LAKATOS: Good afternoon, your Honor. This 25 is Alex Lakatos of Mayer Brown representing Bank Audi

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   SAL.
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry, what was your last name,
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   sir?
              MR. LAKATOS: Oh, sure. It's Lakatos. It's
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   L-A-K-A-T-O-S.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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              MR. LAKATOS: Sure. Thank you, your Honor.
              MR. ANHANG: Good afternoon, your Honor. This
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   is George Anhang with Sherman & Sterling, and we
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   represent Bank of Beirut SAL.
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              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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              MS. FOLEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. This
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   is Elizabeth Foley. I'm here representing Jammal Trust
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   Bank and the Lebanese Central Bank Liquidator, Dr.
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   Muhammed Baasiri, and I'm with Baker Hostetler.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you. Who else do we have?
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   know we have more parties on the line. Anybody else?
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   All right. Is that everybody?
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              Okay. So we're here today because it sounds as
   though the parties are unable to determine how to
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   interpret Judge Amon's list of the discovery stay in this
   case pending additional motion practice. So I'd like to
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   hear from plaintiffs about the type of discovery that
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   they are seeking to begin in this case, and then I'd like
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   to hear from the defendants about why it is their view
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that that type of discovery should not be permitted and, you know, may be too burdensome at this stage of the case given the pending motions.

I know that Jammal Trust Bank, Ma. Foley's client, may be differently situated than some of the others, but if people are able to consolidate their arguments, I don't know if you guys have discussed a lead defense counsel arrangement at all, I would certainly be grateful to hear from anybody who would like to take the lead on certain arguments but will not preclude any party from contributing if they have something they would like to add.

So if you could start, Mr. Osen, with an overview of what you would like to accomplish with regard to discovery and where things stand in that regard, I would appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. OSEN: Sure. Thank you, your Honor.

So there are sort of essentially two requests pending before the Court.

The first is our motion to compel the defendants to participate in a Rule 26(f) conference which as your Honor knows is sort of the general starting point for discovery without which most discovery cannot go forward except as directed by court order. And so that's sort of the first step, and I'll come back in a

moment to the reasons why we think that's appropriate.

The second element of discovery sort of in lieu of the first if we can't proceed in the ordinary course with a Rule 26(f) conference is to proceed with what would be initially limited third party discovery here in New York of the correspondent banks who have transactional records here in the United States that are relevant to the litigation.

And so those are the two sort of broad categories. And I'm happy to go through our understanding sort of background of how we got to this point.

THE COURT: That would be welcome. Thank you.

MR. OSEN: Okay. So we brought our case originally in January of 2019. We amended the complaint in August of that year. And of course the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint thereafter. We had oral argument on August 31st of 2020 and the next day Jammal Trust Bank filed a pre-motion letter seeking substitution and intervention by Mr. Baasiri in essentially a new motion to dismiss.

The Court then on November 25th of last year issued a memorandum and order in which she denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as to our second and third claims for relief which are essentially for shorthand

purposes the JASTA claims under Section 2333(d).

And then subsequent to that, the defendants moved for an interrogatory appeal which was denied. And as part of that denial, the Court issued an order in December, actually December 30th of last year, in which the Court issued a stay of most discovery in the case until the issuance of an opinion by the Second Circuit in Reuvane v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, also more commonly referenced as Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank.

And the one major exception I guess to the stay was that the Court did permit plaintiff to issue preservation subpoenas to New York and U.S. correspondent banks. And that's it. I'm sorry, your Honor, was there questions?

THE COURT: Not from me. I'm on mute. I don't know if anybody else may.

MR. OSEN: Okay. Sorry, your Honor.

So that stay, except for the preservation subpoenas, was in place until the Second Circuit decision in *Kaplan*. And once that occurred, the defendants, as they were directed to in the December 30th order, asked for a continuance of the stay. And in a June 25, 2021 order, the Court denied the application for a further stay and then directed the defendants to let the Court know whether they wanted to answer the complaint or move

to dismiss.

The defendants, as your Honor knows, then moved to dismiss the case again notwithstanding the fact that <code>Kaplan</code>, which they had relied upon in their motions to dismiss, as they saw it as the controlling legal standard, was in fact vacated by the Circuit in its decision this summer.

So they proceeded with their motion to dismiss. The Court denied the stay. And then we contacted defense counsel and sought the scheduling of the Rule 26(f) conference which they declined to participate in. And then we filed in July, July 22nd, a motion to compel the defendant to comply with Rule 26(f) and participate.

And subsequent to that of course, the briefing was completed on September 9th of the motion to dismiss, and then we moved in September, 20th, for third party discovery essentially in the alternative to Rule 26(f) proceedings.

THE COURT: Thank you very much for that overview and that procedural history. It's very helpful.

So as you know, we are newer to the case. The case was reassigned to us at some point over the summer.

And at that juncture, it wasn't clear to me what role

Judge Amon was planning to play with regard to pretrial

supervision because we noted that she had already denied

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the application to stay discovery and we thought discovery would likely proceed. It's now been clarified that our usual arrangement in the eastern district is going to be applicable in this case and we will be managing the pretrial discovery and pretrial case management in the matter.

So I'd like to hear from whoever is taking the lead from the defendants as to why Judge Amon lift of the stay doesn't mean what it says it means, lifting of the stay, and also why the defendants cannot participate in a Rule 26(f) conference and object to this third party discovery at a minimum.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, your Honor. Linda Goldstein, and I will start to address those issues.

The first point is that the stay that was requested after the <code>Kaplan</code> case was decided was a stay pending the Second Circuit's decision in another JASTA case that was then pending, the <code>Honickman</code> case. And the stay that Judge Amon denied was a stay pending Second Circuit's decision in the <code>Honickman</code> case. And after that particular stay was denied, the Court did grant our request to file a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint that had been filed by the plaintiff. And the Court set a rather expeditious briefing schedule and also very streamlined briefs so that our briefs were ten pages

long and our replies were five pages long.

And then two days later after we filed a motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit issued its decision in the Honickman case. And in Honickman, unlike in Kaplan, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim under JASTA against one of the defendants in this case, BLOM Bank, and further articulated the elements of pleading an aiding and abetting claim under JASTA.

We then amended our motion to dismiss to deal with the new issues raised in the Second Circuit's Honickman decision, and the briefing on the motion to dismiss was completed on September 9, almost a month ago. And that briefing raises several critical arguments that could dramatically affect the scope of discovery first with respect to the conspiracy claim, one of the two remaining claims.

Judge Amon's November 2020 decision did not in fact address the substance of the conspiracy claim. The Court held that it did not have to address that given its ruling on the aiding and abetting claim.

The Kaplan decision in fact, the logic of the Kaplan decision, makes it quite clear that the conspiracy claim pleaded in the Bartlett case does not state a cause of action. And certainly, if the conspiracy claim were

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dismissed, that would have a material impact on the scope of any discovery to be taken from the defendant banks.

The other issues raised in the motion to dismiss all pertain to the aiding and abetting claim.

And to give a very short form overview of the allegations in this case, as it currently stands, there are claims against 13 banks arising from the provision of banking services to over 200 different customers in Lebanon.

Judge Amon's decision, which denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the aiding and abetting claim, although it did grant the motion on the primary liability claim, rested in large part on the fact that the complaint alleges that the defendant banks provided services to a number of customers, and a very small number of customers, 19 all together, that had been designated as specially designated global terrorists by the U.S.

Treasury Department.

And what is clear from both the *Kaplan* decision and the *Honickman* decision is that the timing of that designation, or those designations, vis-à-vis the provision of banking services, is a crucial point. And we have argued in the pending motion to dismiss that the complaint as it stands does not adequately plead that any of the moving defendants, who are the 11 defendants that submitted the motion, does not allege that any of those

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banks provided services to any of those 19 customers after the customer was designated as an SDGT and did not contain other allegations that would suffice to meet the general awareness element of a JASTA aiding and abetting claim.

So that is crucial because if, as we have submitted to Judge Amon, those allegations, the lack of timing is fatal, that would call for the dismissal of the claims against at least ten of the current defendants.

Another issue that was raised in the motion to dismiss arising from the Kaplan and the Honickman cases is whether the complaint adequately pleads that any of the 200 or more customers was closely intertwined with the terrorist activities of Hezbollah. And Judge Amon's decision from November of 2020 already held that there was really only a very small number of the customers that had been alleged to be connected at all to Hezbollah's terrorist activities. Those were the Islamic Resistance Support Organization, the IRSO, Martyr's Foundation, and the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the IKRC.

So if none of the other customers were closely intertwined with Hezbollah, then that would call for the dismissal of at least six of the -- I'm sorry, at least five of the moving defendants which would also significantly narrow the case.

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And then if that were to happen, the claims against any of the remaining defendants would not involve discovery of the accounts of 200 customers, it would involve discovery only of the accounts of the handful of customers that were closely intertwined.

So for all of those reasons, the resolution of the motion, it doesn't dispose of the case entirely which we think is a very real possibility. There is a likelihood that it will narrow the case significantly. And the reason that this is particularly important in this case, because certainly as in most cases defendants would argue that the scope of discovery would change, in this case we have the added complication of the Bank Secrecy Act in Lebanon. And so any discovery against the defendant banks of information regarding customer accounts is going to have to go through a commodity analysis to determine the proper scope of that discovery. And so that is why we believe that the better course would certainly be to continue staying discovery against the defendant banks.

As for the third party discovery, we believe that the proper balance was struck when plaintiffs sought, and we consented, to the service of preservation subpoenas upon a number of correspondent banks. And should plaintiffs wish to further protect their interest

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by serving additional preservation subpoenas, we'd certainly have no objection to that. But based on what we've seen, there's no reason to think that the banks that have been served with preservation subpoenas are not honoring their obligations to preserve whatever documents they had in their possession and certainly nothing that's been presented to the Court thus far suggests that they are disregarding the subpoenas. So we think that the plaintiff's interests are adequately protected by that.

THE COURT: So I'd like to go back to one

argument that you made regarding the timing issue, and your argument that the deficiencies in the pleadings as to timing could be fatal with regard to the provisional banking services to people who -- you know, depending on when they were designated.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Wouldn't their banking records be helpful or probative as to determination of when the banking services were provided?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: There's a threshold issue in terms of pleading of whether they have properly alleged knowledge. And plaintiffs have copious records. Mr. Osen's firm has been litigating similar cases against various entities for many years and has, in his complaint, provided copious details of transactions.

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None of them show the provision of services to an FDGT after the designation, and telling me in response to our motion, plaintiff's counsel did not say that discovery would help to identify such evidence and did not say that were misreading the complaint somehow. But in fact he conceded that there was no allegation in the complain that there were such transactions. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Are there any other defendants who would like to be heard on this first question, the threshold question, that I just posed to Ms. Goldstein? All right. MS. FOLEY: Your Honor, this is Elizabeth Foley. THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Foley. MS. FOLEY: Yes, hi. Thank you. I would just like to point out that JTB's position, as you noted initially, is quite different from the other defendants. So I can be brief because this will pertain I assume to a lot of the other questions that your Honor may be having. Our position of course is that as you know, we're parties to an interlocutory appeal as of right under the Collateral Order Doctrine. And we cited

lower courts are pretty uniform on the fact that when you

numerous cases in our letter motions showing that the

17 Proceedings 1 take an interlocutory appeal on an immunity issue under the Collateral Order Doctrine, the district court is the 2 3 divested of jurisdiction on all further proceedings as to 4 the appealing party. 5 So that is our position here both with regard 6 to the 26(f) conference as well as the third party 7 subpoenas. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for that. I certainly understand that you are somewhat differently 9 situated than the other defendants. 10 11 Is there anybody else who'd like to be heard on the arguments that Ms. Goldstein just made in response to 12 13 my questions as to the defendants' arguments as to why 14 they should not be required to participate in discovery 15 and/or why the third party subpoenas are a problem? 16 All right. So I think it's back to you, Mr. 17 Would you like to be heard in response to Ms. Goldstein? 18 19 MR. OSEN: Sure, your Honor. Thank you very 20 much. 21 So I'm going to set for the moment JTB to one 22 side since they're a somewhat unique situation and just

So I'm going to set for the moment JTB to one side since they're a somewhat unique situation and just start with the procedural stuff and then I'm happy to address very briefly some of the substantive points as well.

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So to begin with, I just want to clarify because Ms. Goldstein referred to continuing the stay in this case. There is in fact no stay in place at the moment. And I think that's procedurally significant because the Court's June 25th order denied a further stay and the defendant has never sought an affirmative stay thereafter. They simply pocket vetoed the proper procedure under Rule 26(f) by not cooperating and participating in the conference. And it is pretty much black letter law that where there is no stay in place, under Rule 1, the discovery proceedings are supposed to go forward unless there is an explicit stay. And I think we cited a case from the EDNY, City of New York v. Beretta on that very subject. So there is no stay and they have not sought any stay except in the argument you just heard now.

Moreover, and this gets to the substantive arguments that you heard, first of all, the Court set the briefing schedule in the same order that it denied the stay. So it allowed the defendants to respond as to whether they wanted to move to amend and when they said they did, that was granted on July 6th. So you know, they didn't come back to the Court after Honickman was issued at the end of July and say now we want to renew a request for a stay of discovery. They just simply failed

to comply with Rule 26(f).

Now that being said, just very briefly to address Ms. Goldstein's various points, and I'm going to really try to be brief, your Honor.

First of all, neither *Kaplan* nor *Honickman* address conspiracy. They're both aiding and abetting cases. So that's sort of just a non-starter.

Number two, as a practical matter, as anyone who's looked at the case law on aiding and abetting and conspiracy, they're essentially kissing cousins and it's hard to articulate a basis on which discovery of one would be different from the other.

Ms. Goldstein refers to the fact that they had a quote small number of specially designated global terrorist customers of which only 19 are identified in the complaint during the relevant period. There are literally dozens more after the relevant period, that is who were designated afterward, but who weren't during the years in question.

Moreover, I think most people would agree that 19 designated terrorist customers is 19 too many both practically and legally speaking.

But more importantly, in *Kaplan*, none of the customers were designated during the relevant period.

They were only designated afterwards. And the Court

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nonetheless found that the dismissal was not warranted because designations are one, potential data points for general awareness, but that doesn't mean that because someone is not designated, people don't know who they are or that it's impossible to know that they are in fact terrorists. And that's true, by the way, your Honor, as you can well imagine of literally thousands of terrorists around the world. Not all of them are designated, otherwise the Treasury Department would have to add another couple of wings to the building. Instead, designation is one way in which knowledge is obtained by initial institutions. Another one, for example, is when the customer as we allege offload plane loads of cash and deposits that into a bank account. And in fact, Kaplan gives another example of that with Nazem Ahmad a person who the United Nations identified in a report in 2002 as a Hezbollah connected money launderer and blood diamond trafficker. He wasn't designated by the United States until 2020, but that doesn't mean he wasn't a known Hezbollah operative in 2002 or 2005 or 2010. Moreover, this idea that only a small number of these customers are quote/unquote closely intertwined

Moreover, this idea that only a small number of these customers are quote/unquote closely intertwined with Hezbollah is patently contradicted in every respect by pages and pages of the second amended complaint. We allege that Hezbollah, and we do feel based on U.S.

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Government findings, that Hezbollah operates something called the Business Affairs Component which is basically their commercial wing for fund raising. And not just for Hezbollah, but for Hezbollah's Islamic jihad organization, the part of Hezbollah that commits every single attack that they are responsible for.

And so when Ms. Goldstein refers to 200 customers and only a couple of them are intertwined with Hezbollah, setting aside the ones that the judge specifically identified in her November 2020 decision, and those include the Islamic Resistance Support Organization, whose sole and dedicated purpose is funding Hezbollah's terrorism, or the Martyr Foundation which was the subject of the Kaplan appeal and which is dedicated to supporting the quote/unquote martyrs of Hezbollah.

Setting all that to the side, and multiple defendants have these entities as customers, if you put that all to the side, the commercial enterprises and the hundreds of customers we've identified are all part of the business affairs component of Hezbollah, i.e., they raise and launder money through these defendant banks for the Islamic jihad organization of Hezbollah. There is nothing more closely intertwined with Hezbollah or its violent activities than its Islamic jihad organization.

And so in our view, Ms. Goldstein

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mischaracterizes the district court's opinion by suggesting that it somehow clairvoyantly adopted a closely intertwined standard that didn't exist or was not articulated in those words in *Kaplan* before that decision was issued this summer.

But the Court mentions and discusses our allegations about the Business Affairs Component. It cites examples of the Martyrs Foundation and IRSO as egregious examples of entities that are clearly involved with Hezbollah openly affiliated with them, but in no way suggests that the other 200 entities and customers are somehow innocent or irrelevant to the allegations.

And finally, Ms. Goldstein references Lebanese
Bank secrecy and that's a perfect example of why
discovery should proceed and a Rule 26(f) conference
should be ordered because this is a marathon and not a
sprint. The process just of doing all the things we have
to do in the ordinary course, negotiating a protective
order, talking about electronic discovery protocol, Rule
26 disclosures, all that takes time. It's not something
that's done overnight. And all of that leads to a
process after which the defendants are going to refuse to
produce documents that are requested in Rule 26 discovery
on the grounds that they can't produce records from
Lebanon. And that whole process which we have been

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through on at least five occasions takes anywhere from two years to a decade to resolve. And the sooner we get started on the process and the sooner we get records that are actually available to us that don't require years of litigation to get to, the better off we are, our clients are, and the interest of justice.

THE COURT: Ms. Goldstein, would you like to respond to Mr. Osen's arguments?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes, absolutely. If I could just go in order.

First, with respect to conspiracy, what the Kaplan case made clear is that it was interpreting the statutory language of JASTA and there are portions of the statute that apply both to conspiracy and to aiding and abetting. And it is clear from the Kaplan decision that a claim for conspiracy stands only when the defendant is alleged to have conspired with the principle violator. In this particular case, the principle violator is not Hezbollah but the Iraqi militias which placed or launched the bombs that entered the plaintiffs. So Kaplan is quite material to that.

And the dismissal of the conspiracy case would certainly have an impact on the scope of discovery because I assume that the plaintiffs would be seeking communications that would be communications, for example,

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among the banks that would not be pertinent to an aiding and abetting claim but would be pertinent to a conspiracy claim.

Second, in terms of the FDGT designations, we started with that because Judge Amon's decision made it clear that she considered those to be the strongest allegations and that those allegations were I guess pertinent only to the extent that she inferred or felt it was permissible to infer that the banks provided services to those customers after they had been designated as FDGTs. And our argument based on the Honickman case is that that is not a permissible inference. And to the extent that the decision or Mr. Osen in his opposition raised additional indicia of general awareness, we have provided answers to those as well, and that's now pending before Judge Amon.

What is clear, you know, however, is that if we are right that the inference that services were provided after the designation was not a proper inference to make, then five of the defendants -- I'm sorry, then ten of the defendants should be out of the case.

As for the closely intertwined argument, we believe that characterization of the various customers is squarely based on Judge Amon's decision. And what can't, although we might disagree with Mr. Osen on that, what we

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cannot dispute is that there is a very material difference between discovery involving three or let's say a handful of customers and discovery involving over 200 customers. Those are obviously very different enterprises and scope.

And as for Lebanese bank secrecy, we agree that it is a complex process and a sensitive process, and it is our view that that process is best embarked upon when we have the Court's final decision as to the scope of the case so that when requests made are to the appropriate authorities in Lebanon regarding disclosure, that those are the actual requests that are needed for the case, that they're not broader or excessive based on allegations that are subsequently dismissed from the case.

THE COURT: So I may agree with you that getting the records pursuant to the Lebanon Bank Secrecy Act, you know, is a stage that should perhaps be done at a time when it's more crystal clear of what claims remain in the case. But what do you make of Mr. Rosen's arguments that even getting to that point will take some time and that the burden rests on the defendants if they seek a stay of discovery. Particularly given the age of this case, it seems to me that discovery is sort of overdue for getting started which I understand to be part

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of Judge Amon's determination not to continue the stay when she issued her first opinion in the case. Why can't discovery start? Why can't get their third party subpoenas at a minimum?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Well, I suppose the point that the third parties also have an interest if there are only going to be a few banks at issue rather than 13 banks and if there are only going to be a few customers at issue rather more than 200 customers not producing documents that are ultimately not part of the case. And that's not a matter of irrelevance to the defendant banks because although I haven't seen all of the contracts between the defendant banks and their correspondence, it's quite typical in those cases to have indemnification clauses. So those are expenses that would be passed through to the defendant banks.

THE COURT: Mr. Osen, do you have a sense of the scope of the production that you would be requesting vis-à-vis these third party subpoenas?

MR. OSEN: Sure, your Honor. Certainly initially we're focused on this stage on transactional records that involve identified Hezbollah operatives or entities listed in the complaint. Obviously, we don't want to waive anything down the road if we get that far three years from now to follow up with other third party

discovery either to other banks, or other entities, or
what have you. But for what we're talking or
contemplating at the moment, we're talking about
transactional records. These are all electronic records.

The banks routinely search for them but with name

The banks routinely search for them but with name searches. And it's actually easier for them to do it broadly than it is narrowly in our experience.

So you know, to just use an example, if we were to take the Martyrs Foundation and assuming they had responsive transactions, they generally produce, you know, whatever they have that has some variation on that name, and it's easier for them to just do that than to try and spend manpower narrowing it, making sure that we have the precise party, et cetera. So in the past we've gotten anything that has a variation on that spelling or what have you will be produced and then obviously it's under a protective order so we only ultimately can utilize the materials that are relevant.

But each bank is different. Each bank, some of these will do it in house, some hire outside counsel to deal with it. We often have to negotiate with each one of them individually on their burden, how far back their records go, et cetera. So that itself is a not insignificant process but one which, you know, takes time and they're pretty individualized because some are just

more responsive historically. Others drag their feet more and you know, that how it goes.

But in one sense Ms. Goldstein is correct. We would seek discovery as to every Hezbollah related entity that we've identified. And we can't imagine a universe in which Hezbollah related entities, most of which are either designated or related to designated entities, are not relevant to the claims we've made.

THE COURT: How many banks?

MR. OSEN: That I don't know. There are I think roughly eight to ten that potentially have -- that we think might have potentially responsive information, but it might be fewer than that. But generally there are a couple of major clearing banks that do most of this activity.

THE COURT: And would I be correct, sir, that in seeking this -- I don't even want to call it permission because as you point out there is no current stay of discovery and ordinarily parties do not require permission to seek subpoenas physically from a third party. So I don't even want to call it permission. But this discussion we are having about your idea to subpoena these bank records, I presume you are not asking me today to rule in advance on any motions to quash that the defendants could choose to make at a later date if there

29 Proceedings was a specific objection or specific issue with regard to 1 2 a particular subpoena? MR. OSEN: Well, I don't know if it would be so 3 much for the defendants, although there may be 4 5 circumstances where they might as well, but usually it's 6 the bank that receives the subpoena that would come in --7 THE COURT: Oh, I've received motions to quash from parties too for third party subpoenas. So anybody 8 9 can try. 10 MR. OSEN: Okay. Anyone can try. That is 11 true, your Honor. 12 The reason we framed it at as permission is 13 that the sort of normal process under Rule 26 is for us 14 to have a 26(f) conference, do all of that as a 15 preliminary before engaging in any discovery, even 16 document discovery requests, let alone third party 17 discovery. So we have framed it in that way because the 18 sort of ordinary process of just sitting on a conference 19 call and working through things like language for the 20 protective order hasn't occurred here. 21 THE COURT: Fair enough. And thank you for 22 that. 23 So Ms. Goldstein, I have a feeling you know 24 what my thinking basically is on this. And as I'm sure 25 you are well versed, the filing of a dispositive motion,

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even one that suggests the district court doesn't have jurisdiction, does not automatically warrant an issuance of a stay under Rule 26. And given the age of this case, you know, I have concerns about the fact that discovery has not even begun. It sounds complex. As the parties may be aware, I myself have substantial experience working through bank record subpoenas and things of that nature from my litigating days and I hear Mr. Osen in terms of the length of time that these things take.

I also hear the defendants said that it's burdensome. And I have gotten many a phone call from the banks over the years saying do you really need every one of these accounts? Do you really need this guy? Do you really need this? We can only go this far back. So I hear, you know, what Mr. Osen is saying. I also hear about the potential burden that this poses on the defendant correspondent banks, the possibility that they may seek recompense or indemnification from the defendants named in this case.

But in the determination of whether a stay of discovery is appropriate, I have to look at the various factors under the law including whether you made a strong showing that the plaintiff's claim is not meritorious, the breadth of discovery, and the burden of responding to it, and the risk of unfair prejudice to the plaintiff.

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And I think you have made a very strong argument that there may be aspects of this case that don't survive after the motion to dismiss. But exactly what the contours of the case at this stage would look like, we can't know. And so although I do give that first factor, whether you've made a strong showing that the plaintiffs' claims are not meritorious with some weight, I do not think that the breadth of discovery that the plaintiff is seeking at this juncture is so burdensome that it creates an undue burden for the defendants in the ordinary practice that discovery is to commence and to be self-executing.

And as to the third factor, I have concerns about unfair prejudice to the plaintiff. As we have already made note of, this is a lengthy process to get these records. The case has already been pending for a couple of years and I think that, you know, it's time to get cracking on the discovery process so that the parties could have a better sense of where the case is going.

So with all respect for the fact that there are motions pending and that the parties have concerns about commencing a discovery, I do want the parties to sit down and have a meet and confer and discuss what discovery would look like and what you could agree on and what you can't agree on. And if you truly cannot agree on scope

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of discovery and everything else, I'm not saying you have to turn over everything immediately, that's what the initial Rule 26(f) conference is for, is for the parties to sit and discuss and meet and confer. I want that conference to happen. And I can give the parties my normal case management worksheet, but it will be of no use to you guys given the complexity of the case. It works very well for smaller cases but I think it won't be very helpful to you and your experienced teams in this case.

So I welcome a proposal from the parties about what discovery should look like, how it could be phased, and what the timing of that discovery would look like.

And I also think that the plaintiffs, you know, should be permitted to start their process with regard to getting bank subpoenas. Those records, you know, from the banks' perspective, yes, it can be burdensome to produce than, but it's not crazy burdensome. They have computers, they have subpoena compliance departments, they have entire groups of his banks dedicated for this specific purpose and it is important information that the plaintiffs need to work through their case.

Of course, the scope of discovery could change as soon as Judge Amon rules on the motion to dismiss.

And I frankly suspect that given the complexities here

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that the parties won't be very far along in the discovery process when her opinion is issued.

So for that additional reason, I just don't think that the defendants have met their burden to show that a stay of discovery continues to be appropriate in this case.

I will note that the JTB defendants are

differently situated and will excuse them from participating in discovery for the time being. And Ms. Foley, do you have any sense from the Circuit about whether your case is being set for oral argument? The briefing schedule, what the timing looks like?

MS. FOLEY: Thank you, your Honor. Our initial opening brief is due on October 27th, so we're still about three weeks away from that, and then the usual time lines for their reply, the opposition reply. So we're just beginning the process in terms of formal papers toward the end of this month.

THE COURT: I see. Okay. So I do think that that issue may be premature to require your client to participate in this Rule 26(f) conference. But given Ms. Goldstein's very, very thorough and excellent presentation here today, I think all of the banks' interests will be protected if there's a Rule 26(f) conference in terms of not over-committing too quickly to

34 Proceedings 1 any particular production and that Ms. Goldstein and your 2 co-counsel on the case, although not representing your 3 client but counsel and the defense side, will represent 4 all defendants' interests in terms of trying to come up 5 with a reasonable plan here. 6 So Ms. Goldstein, I understand this is 7 complicated and I understand it's going to take the 8 parties some time. Do you have thoughts on when we should have another status conference to check in on the 10 parties as to how things are proceeding? 11 MS. GOLDSTEIN: I would suggest 60 days. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Osen, how does that sound to 13 you? 14 MR. OSEN: I think it depends obviously on when 15 we do our initial Rule 26(f) conference. I would think 16 we know probably a little sooner, maybe in 45 days, 17 whether we have a meaningful impasse. We could always 18 join the request pushing out if we need more time, but I 19 would prefer to set it a little earlier. 20 THE COURT: Well, that's a great question. You 21 know, I know that this is scheduling -- even the

THE COURT: Well, that's a great question. You know, I know that this is scheduling -- even the scheduling in this case is going to be complex in terms of a meet and confer and having a Rule 26(f) conference.

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So Ms. Goldstein, do you have an estimate of when you think might be a realistic time frame before

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which the parties could have that initial discussion and styled as a Rule 26(f) conference?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Well, as you probably could tell from the roster of the people attending this call, which is a subset of the people who need to be involved in the conference, because we don't have most of the junior lawyers who are charged with the marshaling of resources for discovery, (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Ms. Goldstein, I missed part of what you said.

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Oh, I'm sorry. I just said that I thought it would take at least 30 days before we could align everybody's calendars to have a conference.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, my phone kind of cut in and out there. I don't know if it's on my end or on your end. But given the breadth of the number of people involved alone, I think that expecting the parties to be able to find a mutually agreeable time within 30 days is not unreasonable. And as a consequence, Mr. Rosen, I am going to request that the parties either provide a status report or we have a status conference at the 60 day mark. Given the complexity of getting everybody freed up for a status conference, do you have a strong view, Mr. Osen, as to whether or not a 60 day out status report or 60 day out status conference would be preferable?

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MR. OSEN: I think we should have a conference. In my experience, your Honor, nothing focuses the mind of counsel like having to answer to the Court. And so I would prefer a status conference.

I'd also add if it's amenable to the Court, we'd like to at least begin the process of third party discovery essentially as soon as we effectively can.

THE COURT: Yes. I thought I had made clear, I thought that the third party subpoenas need to begin and I note that those are without prejudice to any party to make an appropriate motion in response to the specific service and specific process that you ultimately seek to issue. I'm not inviting discovery disputes, but I just want to make clear that this is -- I'm not giving you the blessing to do whatever you want. Obviously, everyone's rights are preserved if there is an issue with the subsequent process that you seek to serve on those banks. So yes, the third party subpoenas are certainly free to be issued when you're able to get that rolling. I do think the 30 days out for Rule 26(f) conference target date for the parties would be great.

And Ms. Chan, do we have a date we could offer to the parties in mid-December for a follow-up status conference?

THE CLERK: Sure, Judge. Just give me one

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   second to take a look. How is --
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              MS. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor --
              THE CLERK: -- December 13th at 10:15?
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry? Okay. I don't know who
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 5
   just spoke but everyone write down December 13th at
 6
   10:15. And who just spoke?
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              MS. GOLDSTEIN: This is Linda Goldstein. I
   just wanted to raise the point on third party discovery,
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   whether that was a two-way street and the defendants
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   could also serve third party subpoenas.
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              THE COURT: Absolutely.
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              MS. FOLEY: Your Honor, if I may? This is
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   Elizabeth Foley.
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              THE COURT:
                          Yes.
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              MS. FOLEY: Yes. I heard that you excused us
   from the 26(f) conference, but just a point of
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17
   clarification, this also I assume excludes us from
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   discovery as to third parties or other discovery pending
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   disposition of the Second Circuit appeal?
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              THE COURT: I don't know how you would be able
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   to given the third party discovery process, but if that
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   arises, you can let me know.
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              MS. FOLEY: Meaning that if a third party
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   discovery is attempted with regard to someone who has
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   records or information regarding JTB that we would then
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object at that time even though we should be divested —

THE COURT: I mean it's not clear to me that

you're immune from discovery, from other parties getting

discovery about you. That's not clear to me on the

current record or the current cases that have been cited

in support of your argument as to why you yourself should

not be participating in discovery. But I don't think

that you get also a security blanket in a bubble if other

banks have information about you.

MS. FOLEY: Well, I would like to speak on that if possible, your Honor. I would like to be heard. did actually cite a case from DBC on this specific issue which held that in fact the bubble, as you referred to it, the immunity, in order to protect the purpose of the immunity, divestiture is complete and that includes discovery as to third parties. And the rationale of that is that -- I guess think of it this way, if you were claiming an immunity as a judge, some sort of absolute judicial immunity, the district court had denied that, and then the plaintiff wanted to proceed against you by seeking third party discovery, maybe depositions of coworkers or documents from the hands of your bank, or something like that, that kind of discovery against third parties is intrusive and the point of the divestiture and the immunity itself is to make sure that the defendant

who claims the immunity enjoys the robustness of it and the immunity from suit including all the burdens attendant to it.

So I do think that there are instances in which discovery against third parties would undermine the entire purpose of the immunity.

of the reasons that I suggested that you would let me know if you think that some sort of process or attempt to obtain information does in fact invade the sort of bubble that you're afforded because I frankly don't know exactly what the plaintiff's subpoenas will look like. And I appreciate the analogies close to home, but you know, it's just sort of abstract. You know, I just am not at all certain what fact pattern would develop that would result in concern that was properly grounded on the case law that you cited.

And you know, for example, if the plaintiff's subpoena was squarely like to a correspondent bank, like any and all transactions involving this bank, that could be -- you could then be in a position of saying this is too far, this is appropriate for a motion to quash. And I get that you feel that you should not have to participate in litigation at all because of the sovereign immunity argument. But I'm not going to prejudge a fact

1 pattern that's not before me. I just can't do that.

So you know, I caution Mr. Osen to understand that you have an interlocutory appeal pending that provides sovereign immunity protection potentially and that it would be best if he doesn't create litigation issues with regard to that. But until there's a specific fact pattern touching upon the sovereign immunity issue that may attend to your client, I just don't think we can say definitively that there's no discovery that could touch upon your client. That just doesn't -- it's just premature. We don't have the facts relevant to make that finding.

MS. FOLEY: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. We'll keep that in mind and should the plaintiff seek discovery that does burden JTB, then we would make the appropriate motion to quash. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes. And I do hear you. And I hope, Mr. Osen, that you're hearing me. Okay? Are you hearing me, sir?

MR. OSEN: I certainly hear your Honor. I think it's safe to say the plaintiffs are looking for the path of least resistence to get discovery where we can.

And I would also add that the likelihood of getting discovery from JTB as a designated global terrorist is in general pretty low. So we certainly hear what your

41 Proceedings 1 Honor's saying. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. So with that, we have the target date of the parties 3 4 participating in a Rule 26(f) conference within the next 5 30 days which puts us out to November 8th I guess. Or 6 November 7th if you want to be really technical about it. 7 Let me look at the days of the week. November 7th is a Sunday. So I'd like to ask the parties to participate in 8 the Rule 26(f) conference by December 8th. And we will have another status conference in the case December 13th 10 11 at 10:15 a.m. Does that time work for you, Mr. Osen? 12 MR. OSEN: Yes, your Honor, that's fine. 13 THE COURT: Does that time work for you, Ms. 14 Goldstein? 15 MS. GOLDSTEIN: It does. 16 THE COURT: Is there anyone on the call who 17 cannot appear or have a designee appear on that date, 18 December 13th, at 10:15? Please speak up and identify 19 yourself if you are in that situation. All right. So it 20 looks like we have a date and a time, and a little bit of 21 a plan forward. 22 I do caution you, Mr. Osen, to be mindful of 23 the various complexities here and, you know, if 24 necessary, tread lightly, and as you say, take the path 25 of least resistence, choose your battles. All of those

42 Proceedings 1 things, all of those cheesy analogies. I do want to help 2 get this discovery started but I am going to be very mindful about the burden on the defendants given the 3 4 posture and the possibility of success on their motion to 5 dismiss at least in part. So I want to do this in a staged way and I'm happy to hear the parties' proposal as 6 7 to how they can do that in a way that seems fair and 8 reasonable but does start the process of moving the discovery along. 9 10 And with that, Mr. Osen, is there anything 11 further that we should attempt to take up today? 12 MR. OSEN: Not for the plaintiffs, your Honor. 13 Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Ms. Goldstein, starting with you on 15 behalf of the defendants? MS. GOLDSTEIN: Nothing further to raise, your 16 17 Honor. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. Is there any other 19 defendant who would like to add any final comments, 20 remarks, thoughts, questions? And if so, please identify 21 yourself and who you represent. 22 All right. So it sounds like we have a little 23 bit of a plan forward and it's nice to meet you all. 24 Thank you both for your excellent presentations and 25 arguments. I feel that I've learned a lot about the

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   procedural history, that it just feels more granular
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   hearing it in argument than just simply reviewing it from
    the docket and reading Judge Amon's prior opinions. So I
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    appreciate your time and efforts today and I look forward
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    to speaking with you all again in December. Take care.
              MULTIPLE SPEAKERS: Thank you, your Honor.
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                          (Matter concluded)
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CERTIFICATE

I, MARY GRECO, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the said proceedings is a true and accurate transcript from the electronic sound-recording of the proceedings reduced to typewriting in the above-entitled matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this <u>14th</u> day of <u>October</u>, 2021.

Mary Areco
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